Directed Verdicts for the Prosecution in Criminal Cases

Wyoming Law Journal Wyoming Law Journal

Volume 7 Number 1 Article 1

December 2019

Directed Verdicts for the Prosecution in Criminal Cases Directed Verdicts for the Prosecution in Criminal Cases

John H. Henderson Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation Recommended Citation

John H. Henderson Jr.,

Directed Verdicts for the Prosecution in Criminal Cases

, 7 WYO. L.J. 37 (1952)

Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol7/iss1/1

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WYOMING

LAW

JOURNAL

VOL.

7

FALL,

1952

NO.

1

STUDENT

EDITORIAL

BOARD

GEORGE

M.

AposToLos

GLENN

W.

BUNDY

W.

RANDALL

BOYER

G.

J.

CARDINE

WARD

A.

WHITE

MARGIE

MILLHONE

DUDLEY

D.

MILES,

Editor-in-Chief

WILLIAM

G.

WALTON,

Business

Manager

FACULTY

ADVISORS

FRANK

J.

TRELEASE

E.

GEORGE

RUDOLPH

Member,

National

Conference

of

Law

Reviews

Published

Quarterly

in

the

Fall,

Winter,

Spring,

and

Summer

by

the

University

of

Wyoming

School

of

Law

and

the

Wyoming

State

Bar.

Subscription

Price

$2.00

per

year;

50c

per

copy.

Mailing

Address:

College

of

Law;

University

of

Wyoming,

Laramie,

Wyoming.

NOTES

DIRECTED

VERDICTS

FOR

THE

PROSECUTION

IN

CRIMINAL

CASES

Directed

verdicts

for

the

defendant

in

criminal

cases

are

commonplace

and

cause

no

surprise.

Perhaps

less

well

known

is

the

fact

that

some

jur-

isdictions

allow

directed

verdicts

for

the

prosecution

in

criminal

cases.

Jurisdictions

following

this

minority

rule

allow

it

only

under

limited

con-

ditions.

When the

requirements

are

complied

with,

these

courts

have

held

that

it

does

not

violate

the

constitutional

guarantee

of

a

jury

trial.

Since

the

prosecution

cannot

invoke this

rule

except

where

the

facts

are

un-

disputed,

the

defendant

is

not

deprived

of

his

right

to

have

the

jury

decide

disputed

questions

of

fact.

In

all the

cases

discussed

herein,

whether

the

privilege

is

allowed

or

denied,

there

is

no

conflict

in

the

facts

and

the

testimony

stands

uncontradicted.

[37]

WYOMING LAW

JOURNAL

Deprivation

of

the

defendant's

constitutional

right

to

a

jury

trial

is

the

theory

upon

which

a

directed

verdict for

the

prosecution

is

denied

in

a

majority

of

American

jurisdictions.'

This

majority

view

is

typified

by

the

Federal

rule,

2

which reasons

that

all

questions

of

fact

must

be

tried

by

the

jury,

and

that

a

question

of fact

is

raised

merely

by

a

plea

of

not

guilty.

Once

raised,

the

jury

alone

has

the

right

to

deliberate

upon

it

and

to

determine

the

guilt

or

innocence

of

the

defendant.

3

The

court

decides

the

competency

of

the

evidence,

but

the

privilege

of

deciding

questions

of

fact

rests

solely

with

the

jury.

Except

for

this

stumbling

block

of

logic,

the

amount

and

condition

of

the

evidence

would

alone determine

whether

a

directed

verdict

could

be

given.

The

power

to

direct

a

verdict

is

merely

a

more

efficient

use

of

the

right

to

order

a

new

trial

in

a

civil

case

when

the

court

disagrees

with

the

verdict

of

the

jury.

By

this

means

the

court

prevents

the

giving

of

useless

verdicts

which

it

would

not

accept.

But,

say

the

majority,

since

criminal

courts

do

not

have

this

right

to

review

the

jury's

verdict,

this

reasoning

cannot

be

applied

and

they

will

not

be

allowed

to

do

indirectly what

they

cannot

do

directly.

4

However,

a

judgment

rendered

upon

such

a

directed

verdict

is

not

void

but

merely

erroneous.

5

Under

the

orthodox

rule

it

is

immaterial

how

conclusive

the

evidence

is

against

tht

defendant

and,

indeed,

whether

he

makes

any

defense

what-

soever.

The

defnedant

is

presumed

to

be

innocent,

and

this

presumption

challenges

the

truth

of

all

the

evidence

that

is

offered against

him.

Thus

all

of

the

evidence

that

is

offered

by

the prosecution

automatically

raises

a

question

of

fact,

whether

the

defendant

makes

any

defense

or

not.

The

jury

must

be

given

an

opportunity

to

consider

all

the

evidence

entered,

since

it

may

perhaps

conclude

that

one

of

the

evidence

is

worthy

of

belief.

Once

a

plea

of

not

guilty

has

been

formally

made,

admissions made

by

either

the

defendant

6

or

his

counsel

7

cannot

be

construed

as

a

plea

of

guilty,

since

the

plea

must

come

from

the

defendant

and

not

from

the

court.

Although

holding

that

a

directed

verdict

cannot

be

given

in

a

criminal

case,

the

Federals

and

the

New

Jersey

9

courts

feel

that

the

jury

can

be

given

some

hint

of

what

they

should

do.

In

a

Federal

case

the

judge,

when

commenting

upon

the

evidence,

told the

jurors

that

it

was

their

moral

but

not

their

legal

duty

to

return

a

verdict

of

guilty,

while

in

New

Jersey

the

judge

was

able

to

tell

them,

as

being

within

his

judicial

privilege

and

duty,

what he

himself

would

do.

1.

23

C.J.S.

674,

Sec.

1146.

2.

United

Brotherhood,

Etc.

v.

U.S.

330

U.S.

395,

67,

S.

Ct.

775,

91

L.

Ed.

973

(1947).

3.

Bardin

v.

Commonwealth,

191

Ky.

651,

231

S.W.

208

(1921).

4.

U.S.

v.

Taylor,

11

Fed.

470

(C.C.D.

Kan.

1882).

5.

Williams

v.

Pierson,

301

Ky.

302,

191

S.W.2d

574

(1945).

6.

People

v.

Pyttenberg,

278

N.Y.S.

31

(1935).

7.

Carter

v.

State,

204

Ga.

242,

49

S.E.2d

492

(1948).

8.

Morgan

et

al.

v.

U.S.,

98

F.2d

473

(8th

Cir.

1938).

9.

State

v.

Seifert,

86

N.J.L.

706,

92

A.

345

(1914).

NOTES

The

more

liberal

minority

rule

allows

directed

verdicts

for

the

prose-

cution

where

the

facts

are

undisputed,

on

the

theory

that

then

there

is

no

question

of

fact

for

the

jury

to

determine.

1

0

Under

this

approach

all

that

must

be

done

is

apply

the

law

to

the

uncontested

facts.

in

order

to

prevent

misuse

of

this

doctrine

the

courts

allowing

it

have

surrounded

itwith

numreous

safeguards

of

various

kinds.

The

basic

pur-

pose of

these

safeguards

is

twofold:

First,

that

all

actual

questions

of

fact

must

be

decided

by

the

jury

so

that

none

of

the

defendant's

constitutional

protection

is

eliminated.

Second,

that

the

criminal

procedure

shall

not

be

burdened

by

requiring

useless

acts

by

the

jury

where

they

serve

no

useful

function.

When

there

is

no

true

question

of

fact, the

facts

being

undis-

puted,

a

jury's

verdict

would

constitute

such

a

useless

act.

The

presence

of

intent

or

its

lack

presents

a

question

of

fact.

Thus

when

intent

is

a

material element

in

the

crime,

it

must

be

submitted

to

the

jury

for

their

determination.

1

Admission

by

the

defendant

in

court

of

his

intent

provides

an

exception;

under

such

circumstances

the

question

of

his

intent

need

not

be

submitted

to

the

jury.'

2

As

we

have

already

observed,

the giving

of

a

directed

verdict

is

merely

a

more efficient

use

of

the

power

to

order

a

new

trial.

The

court

cannot

order

a

second

trial

in

criminal

cases

in

jurisdictions

which

forbid

double

jeopardy

of

life

or limb.'

8

Therefore,

in

at

least

one

jurisdiction,'

4

it

has

been

held

that

verdicts

for

the

prosecution

in

criminal

cases

can

be directed

only when

the

crime

is

punishable

solely

by

a

fine-for

under

the

"life

or

limb"

provision,

jeopardy

does

not

attach

where

a

fine

is

the

only

penalty.'

5

Indicative

of

the

extreme

caution

of

the

courts

in

allowing

the

prose-

cution

a

directed

verdict

is

the

attitude

taken

by

the

Supreme

Court

of

Arkansas.

Adding

even

further

assurance

that

the

privilege

will

not

result

in

abuse,

the directed

verdict

for the

prosecution

will

be

allowed

only

".*.

when

the

evidence

is

reasonable

and

consistent

and

the

witnesses

stand

unimpeached

on account

of

either

bias

or

prejudice,

and

nothing

is

shown

in

the

evidence

which

would

raise

any

question

as

to

their

veracity,

and

the

evidence

offered

is

of

such

a

nature

that

it

would

be

arbitrary

and

capricious

for

a

jury

to

refuse

to

believe

the

witnesses,

and

the

proof

is

such

that

reasonable minds

could

draw

only

one conclusion

from

the

evidence,

that

conclusion

being

the

guilt

of

the

party."'

6

Although

research

has

discovered

no

Wyoming

cases

exactly

in point,

it

is

possible

that

Article

1,

Section

10

of

the

Wyoming

Constitution

which

provides

that,

"In

all

criminal

prosecutions

the

accused

shall

have

the

10.

People

v.

Elmer,

109

Mich.

493,

67

N.W.

550

(1896).

11.

People

v.

Neumann,

85

Mich.

98,

48

N.W.

290

(1891).

12.

People

v.

Neal,

143

Mich.

271,

106

N.W.

857

(1906).

13.

Roberts

v.

State,

84

Ark.

564,

106

S.W.

952

(1907).

14.

Collins

v.

State,

183

Ark.

425,

36

S.W.2d

75

(1931).

15.

1

Bish.

Cr.

L.

990.

16.

Paxton

v.

State,

114

Ark.

393,

170

S.W.

80

(1914).

WYOMING

LAW

JOURNAL

right

...

to

a

speedy

trial

by

an

impartial

jury

. .

."

would

compel

ad-

herence

to

the

majority

orthodox

rule.

In

evaluating

the

worth

of

the

two

conflicting

judicial

points

of

view

involved

in

this

problem,

it

may

be

observed

that

under

the

majority,

or

orthodox

view,

when

the

defendant

pleads

not

guilty,

the

jury

must

de-

liberate

whether

there

is

a

true

question

of

fact

or

not.

The

purpose

of

the

rule

is

to

have

the

jury

determine

all

actual

questions

of

fact,

but

under

it

the

jury

must

often

deliberate

when

there

is

no such

real

question

of

fact.

It

is

submitted

that

the

fundamental

principle

upon

which

the

orthodox

rule

rests

is

recognized

by

the

minority

rule,

which

sends

all

actual

factual

disputes

to

the

jury.

The

advantage

of

the

minroity

rule

is

that

only

such

disputed

questions

of

fact

are

sent

to

the

jury,

with

con-

sequent

saving

of

time,

effort

and

expense.

When

surrounded

by

the

safeguards

imposed

by

the

Arkansas

view,

it

would

seem

hypertechnical

to

say

that

the

right

to

trial

by

jury

has

been

violated.

Historically,

the

preoccupation

of

courts

with

the

form

of

the

law

rather

than

its

substance

has

rendered

them

less

sensitive

to

the

needs

of

society.

As

between

two

rules

fulfilling

the

same

substantive

function

the

one

less

concerned

with

mere

form

is

the

better

rule.

To

allow

a

directed

verdict

for

the

prosecution

in

criminal

cases

where

the

facts

are

undisputed

tends

to

prevent

incrustation

of the

law

with

useless

form

and

meaningless

fiction.

JOHN

LAWRENCE

HENDERSON,

JR.