Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, Ill Director, Federal Bureau of

Testimony of Robert S. Mueller,

Ill

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Before the United States Senate

Committee on the Judiciary

Sunset Provisions of the USA Patriot Act

April

5, 2005

Good morning Mr. Chairman. Senator Leahy and Members of the Committee.

am pleased to be

here today with the Attorney General to talk with you about the ways in which the USA Patriot Act

has assisted the FBI with its efforts in the war on terror. For almost three and a half years, the

USA Patriot Act has changed the way the FBI operates. Many of our counterterrorism successes

are the direct result of the provisions of the Act. As you know, several of these provisions are

scheduled to "sunset" at the end of this year. I firmly believe that it is crucial to our national

security to renew these provisions. Without them, the FBI might well be forced into pre-

September

lth practices, requiring us

agents, analysts and our partners -to fight the war on

terror with one hand tied behind our backs.

USA Patriot Act SUNSET PROVISIONS

Section

201

202

Expanded Title

Ill

predicates

These provisions expanded the predicate offenses for Title Ill intercepts to include crimes relating

to chemical weapons (18 U.S.C.

229), terrorism (18 U.S.C.

§§

2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332d,

2339A, and 2339B), and felony violations of computer fraud and abuse (18 U.S.C.

1030). Later

amendments to this portion of the statute expanded the Title Ill predicates to also include 18

U.S.C.

2232f (Bombings of places of public use, Government facilities, public transportation

systems and infrastructure facilities) and 23390 (terrorism financing).

Section 201 brought the federal wiretap statute into the 21st century. Prior to its passage, law

enforcement was not authorized to conduct electronic surveillance when investigating crimes

committed by terrorists, such as chemical weapons offenses, killing U.S. nationals abroad, using

weapons of mass destruction, and providing material support to terrorist organizations. Section

201 closed an existing gap in the Title

Ill statute. Now Agents are able to gather information when

looking into the full range of terrorism related crimes.

Similarly, Section 202 brought the criminal code up to date with modern technology by adding

felony offenses under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, such as computer espionage,

extortion and intentionally damaging a federal government computer, to the list of wiretap

predicates in 18 U.S.C. §2516(1). This provision eliminated an anomaly in the law and now

permits Agents to obtain wiretap orders to monitor wire and oral communications to investigate

serious computer crimes.

Section

203

(b)

(d)

Information sharing for foreign intelligence obtained in a Title

Ill

and

criminal investigations.

Section

203(b) authorizes the sharing of foreign intelligence information obtained in a Title

I11

electronic surveillance with other federal officials, including intelligence officers, DHSlDODllCE

officials, and national security officials. If Section 203(b) were allowed to expire, FBI Agents would

be allowed to share certain foreign intelligence information collected through criminal investigative

wiretaps with foreign intelligence services, such as MI-5, but would arguably not be allowed to

share that same information with the CIA. This result would be inconsistent with the spirit of the

recently enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which included many

provisions designed to enhance information sharing within the federal government. Section

203(d) authorizes the sharing of foreign intelligence information collected in a criminal

investigation with intelligence officials.

The information sharing provisions are overwhelmingly heralded by FBI Field Offices as the most

important provisions in the USA Patriot Act. The ability to share critical information has

significantly altered the entire manner in which terrorism investigations are conducted, allowing

for a much more coordinated and effective approach than prior to the USA Patriot Act.

Specifically, the Field Offices note that these provisions enable case agents to involve other

agencies in investigations resulting in a style of teamwork that enables more effective and

responsive investigations; improves the utilization of resources allowing a better focus on the

case; allows for follow-up investigations by other agencies when the criminal subject leaves the

U.S.; and helps prevent the compromise of foreign intelligence investigations.

Even though the law prior to the USA Patriot Act provided for some exchange of information, the

law was complex and as a result, agents often erred on the side of caution and refrained from

sharing the information. Clarification of information sharing abilities, due in part to Section 203,

eliminated that hesitation and allows agents to more openly work with other government entities

resulting in a much stronger team approach. Such an approach is necessary in order to

effectively prevent and detect the complex web of terrorist activity. As a result, our Field Offices

report enhanced FBI liaison with State, Local and other Federal agencies, resulting in better

relationships. Even Legal Attaches (Legats) notice improved relationships with intelligence

agencies. If even a portion of the information sharing capabilities is allowed to 'sunset' or

terminate, then the element of uncertainty could be re-introduced and agents will again hesitate

and take the time necessary to seek clarification of complicated information sharing restrictions

prior to sharing information. This hesitation will lead to less teamwork and much less efficiency.

Experience has taught the FBI that there are no neat dividing lines that distinguish criminal.

terrorist, and foreign intelligence activity. Criminal, terrorist and foreign intelligence organizations

and activities are often interrelated or interdependent. FBI files are full of examples of

investigations where information sharing between counterterrorism, counterintelligence and

criminal intelligence efforts and investigations was essential to the FBl's ability to protect the

United States from terrorists, foreign inteiligence activity and criminal activity. Some cases that

start out as criminal cases become counterterrorism cases. Some cases that start out as

counterintelligence cases become criminal cases. Sometimes the FBI must initiate parallel

criminal and counterterrorism or counterintelligence cases to maximize the FBl's ability to

adequately identify, investigate and address a variety of threats to the United States. The success

of these cases is entirely dependent on the free flow of information between the respective

investigations, investigators and analysts.

Ongoing criminal investigations of transnational criminal enterprises involved in counterfeiting

goods, druglweapons trafficking, money laundering and other criminal activity depend on close

coordination and information sharing with the FBl's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence

Programs, as well as the Intelligence Community, when intelligence is developed which connects

these criminal enterprises to terrorism, the material support of terrorism or state sponsored

intelligence activity. In one such case, information from a criminal Title Ill and criminal

investigation was passed to Counterterrorism, as well as intelligence community partners,

because the subject of the criminal case had previously been targeted by other agencies.

Information sharing permitted each agency to pool their information and resources to investigate

the interplay of criminal and foreign intelligence activity.

In one instance, a terrorism case initiated in Minneapolis was subsequently transferred to San

Diego and converted to a criminal case. The investigation focused on a group of Pakistan-based

individuals who were involved in arms trafficking, the production and distribution of multi-ton

quantities of hashish and heroin, and the discussion of an exchange of a large quantity of drugs

for four stinger anti-aircraft missiles to be used by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The operation

resulted in the arrest, indictment and subsequent deportation of the subjects, Syed Mustajab

Shah, Muhammed Afridi, and liyas Ali, from Hong Kong to San Diego to face drug charges and

charges of providing material support to Al Qaeda.

Criminal enterprises are also frequently involved in, allied with or otherwise rely on smuggling

operations.

lien

smugglers frequently use the same routes used by drug and kontraband

smugglers and do not limit their smuggling to aliens, smuggling anything or anyone for the right

price.~erroristscan take advantage

these smuggling routes and smuggling enterprises to

enter the U.S. and are willing to pay top dollar to smugglers. Intelligence developed in these

cases also frequently identifies corrupt U.S. and foreign officials who facilitate smuggling

activities. Current intelligence, based on information sharing between criminal, counterterrorism,

and counterintelligence efforts, has identified smugglers who provide false travel documents to

special interest aliens, deal with corrupt foreign officials, and financially support extremist

organizations, as well as illegitimate and quasi-legitimate business operators in the United States.

who not only use the services of illegal aliens, but are also actively involved in smuggling as well.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, a reliable intelligence asset identified a

naturalized U.S. citizen as a leader among a group of Islamic extremists residing in the U.S. The

subject's extremist views, affiliations with other terrorism subjects, and his heavy involvement in

the stock market increased the potential that he was a possible financier and material supporter

of terrorist activities. Early in the criminal investigation it was confirmed that the subject had

developed a complex scheme to defraud multiple brokerage firms of large amounts of money.

The subject was arrested and pled guilty to wire fraud. The close interaction between the criminal

and intelligence cases was critical to the successful arrest of the subject before he lefl the country

and the eventual outcome of the case.

Section

204

Clarification of Intelligence Exceptions from Limitations on Interception and

Disclosure of Wire, Oral and Electronic Communications

Section 204 is essentially a technical amendment. It clarifies that the law which governs the

installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices will not interfere with certain

foreign intelligence activities that fall outside the definition of "electronic surveillance" in the FlSA

statute. The provision also clarifies that the exclusivity provisions in Title

18 section 251 1(2)(f)

apply not only to the interception of wire and oral communications, but also to the interception of

electronic communications.

Section 206

Roving FlSA Surveillance

With this provision, when a FlSA target's actions have the effect of thwarting surveillance, such

as by rapidly switching cell phones or even meeting venues, the Court can issue an order

directing an as yet unknown cell phone carrier or other company to effect the authorized

electronic surveillance. This allows the FBI to go directly to the new carrier and establish

surveillance on the authorized target without having to return to the Court for a new secondary

order.

Section 206 has been extremely helpful especially with regard to international terrorism and

foreign counterintelligence investigations where targets move quickly and often act evasively to

avoid detection. Field Offices have observed counterintelligence targets change services for hard-

line telephones and cell phones numerous times. The roving authority allows us to continuously

monitor these targets without interruption. By minimizing the need to return to the court for

additional authorizations, it also has allowed agents to more expeditiously conclude

investigations.

In one case, a roving FlSA on a subject's celluiar telephone was approved for the subject of a

counterintelligence investigation who, per the usage of tradecraft, is directed to change his

cellular phone at regular intervals. The roving FlSA aiiows us to continue coverage on all cell

phones the subject obtains.

Section 207

Extended Duration for Certain FlSAs

Section 207 extends the standard duration for several categories of FlSA orders. Before the

enactment of the USA Patriot Act, FlSA orders for electronic surveillance targeted against agents

of a foreign power had a maximum duration of ninety days and could be extended in 90-day

increments, and orders for a physical search could be issued for no more than

days, unless

the target was a foreign power, in which case, the order could be issued for one year. This

provision allows orders for physical searches to be issued for certain agents of foreign powers,

including United States persons, for ninety days, and authorizes longer periods of searches and

electronic surveillance for certain categories of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers that

are not United States persons. Specifically, initial orders authorizing searches and electronic

surveillance may apply or extend for periods of 120 days, and renewal orders can be extended

for up to one year.

Section 207 has led to reduced papelwork in certain categories of cases. In addition, it has

resulted in a more effective utilization of available personnel resources and the collection

mechanisms authorized under FISA. It has allowed agents to focus their efforts on more

significant and complicated terrorism-related cases and to spend more time ensuring that

appropriate oversight is given to investigations involving the surveillance of United States

persons.

Section 209 -Seizure of Voice Mail with

Search Warrant

Section 209 clarified that voice mail could be obtained with a search warrant under 18 U.S.C.

2703 (similar to e-mail). Previously, some courts had required a Title Ill order to obtain stored

voice mail.

Section 209 of the USA PATRIOT Act has modernized federal law by enabling investigators to

access more quickly suspects'voice-mail by using a search warrant. The speed with which

voice-

mail is seized and searched can often be critical to an investigation.

Section 212

Emergency Disclosures of E-mail

Records by lSPs

Section 212 created a provision that allows a service provider (such as an Internet Service

Provider) to voluntarily provide the content and records of communications related to a subscriber

if it involves an emergency related to death or serious injury.

Service providers have voluntarily provided information under this provision. Such disclosures

often included both e-mail content and associated records. This provision has also been utilized

to quickly locate kidnaping victims, protect children in child exploitation cases, and to quickly

respond to bomb and death threats. Legats have also utilized this provision to assist foreign law

enforcement officials with similar emergencies, such as death threats on prosecutors and other

foreign officials. Where time is of the essence, giving service providers the option of revealing this

information without a court order or grand jury subpoena is crucial to receiving the information

quickly and preventing death or serious injury.

In one instance, an FBI Field Division received a bomb threat after hours. After clarifying that the

bomb threat was to the local airport and that the FBI had until noon to meet the caller's demands,

the FBI

JlTF Agents began working with various communications providers to locate the caller.

The caller was identified as a result of an emergency disclosure pursuant to this provision. An

interview of the subject was conducted and the threat was determined to be non-credible by

11:OO a.m.

In a kidnaping case, a 14- year-old girl was abducted. As a result of the FBI's use of this

provision, the suspect was quickly identified and interviewed. He admitted to picking up the girl

and took agents to the truck stop where he had left her. Because of this provision, additional

harm to the girl was prevented and she was returned to her family in a matter of hours. This is but

one example of how essential this provision is for child abduction cases.

Section

214

FlSA Penfrrap Authority

The FBI may now obtain a FlSA penltrap and trace order from the court if "the information likely

to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person, or is

relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine

intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted

solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." This

provision eliminated the previous requirement that the application also contain specific and

articulable facts giving reason to believe that the targeted line was being used by an agent of a

foreign power, or was in communications with such an agent, under specified circumstances. This

provision now more closely tracks the requirements to obtain a penltrap order under the criminal

provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C.

3123. The provision also expands the FlSA penltrap to include

electronic communications, comparable to the criminal penltrap provision.

The results from these penltrap orders often help agents to determine links between the subjects

of different terrorism investigations, identify other unknown associates of the subject, discover

contacts for potential assets, and develop the subject's personal profile. When penltrap orders

are quickly obtained, they allow agents to more quickly identify the associates tied to the subject

of international terrorism investigations than if the agents were required to wait for service

providers to respond to subpoenas for toll records, which can take several months. The old

standard required more fact gathering to meet the threshold to obtain the penltrap order, making

this technique less effective and sometimes even preventing the use of this technique altogether

if the window of opportunity was missed. The FlSA penltrap orders that have been obtained have

been used on both terrorism and counterintelligence cases.

In one terrorism case, the only phone that the Field Office could prove was used by the subject

was his associate's phone. Additionally, the Field Office had insufficient information that this

associate was an agent of a foreign power. Thus, under the previous standard for a FlSA

penltrap, the office may not have succeeded in obtaining the FlSA penltrap order. The standard

established by Section 214 allowed the agents to obtain the penltrap order by demonstrating that

the information to be collected was relevant to an ongoing terrorism investigation. The information

obtained by the penltrap was valuable because it demonstrated the extent that the subject and

his associate were communicating with subjects of other terrorism investigations.

In another example, use of this section allowed FlSA penltrap authority based on the fact that

information was likely to result in foreign intelligence information. This provision allowed the Field

Office to collect data on target lines even when the subject was out of the country and provided

valuable intelligence information regarding the subject, the organization and terrorism- related

matters.

Section

215

Access to Business Records under FlSA

Section 215 changed the standard to compel production of business records under FlSA to

simple relevance (just as in the FlSA pen register standard described above) and expands this

authority from a limited enumerated list of certain types of business records (i.e. hotels, motels,

car and truck rentals) to include "any tangible things (including books, records, papers,

documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or

clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is

not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the

Constitution."

Obtaining business records is a longstanding law enforcement tool. Ordinary grand juries for

years have issued subpoenas to all manner of businesses for records relevant to criminal

investigations. Section 21 5 authorized the FlSA Court to issue similar orders in national security

investigations. It contains a number of safeguards that protect civil liberties. Section 21 5 requires

FBI Agents to get a court order. Agents cannot use this authority unilaterally to compel any entity

to turn over its records. In addition Section 215 has a narrow scope. It can only be used to obtain

foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against

international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. It cannot be used to investigate

ordinary crimes, or even domestic terrorism.

Section

217

Interception of Computer Trespasser Communications

The wiretap statute was amended to explicitly provide victims of computer attacks the ability to

invite law enforcement into a protected computer to monitor the computer trespasser's

communications. In the past, the law was ambiguous on this point and left open the possibility

that a court could hold that a victim of computer hacking could not invite law enforcement in to

monitor the intruder in an effort to prosecute and stop the intruder. The USA Patriot Act also

established specific requirements and limitations that must be met before the use of this

provision.

Under this provision, the FBI was able to monitor the communications of an international group of

"carders" (individuals that use and trade stolen credit card information). The group utilized a

variety of methods to conceal their identities. The owner of the hacked computer was not aware

of the misuse, and considered all individuals misusing its computers to be trespassers. The

monitoring provided leads that resulted in the discovery of the true identity of the subject. The

subject was indicted in September of 2003. Without the ability to monitor these communications,

it would have been unlikely that the FBI could have identified the trespassers.

Section

218

-Change in the "Primary Purpose" Standard of FlSA

Section 218 amended FlSA to require a certification to the FlSA Court that obtaining foreign

intelligence gathering is "a significant purpose" of the FlSA surveillance or search, rather than a

"primary purpose" of such surveillance. Section 504 amended FlSA to clarify that personnel

involved in a foreign intelligence investigation can consult with law enforcement officials in order

to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against attacks, terrorism, sabotage, or clandestine

intelligence activities, and that such consultation does not, in itself, undermine the required

certification of "significant purpose." These changes were intended to eliminate "the wall"

between criminal and intelligence investigations. They now allow FBI agents greater latitude to

consult criminal investigators or prosecutors without putting their investigations at risk.

As stated above, FBI Field Offices

ovewhelmingly herald the information sharing provisions as

the most important provisions in the USA Patriot Act. Section 218 is an essential component to

these changes. This provision makes it clear that prosecutors can be involved in the earliest

phases of an international terrorism investigation.

AUSAs are often co-located with the JTTFs and

are able to provide immediate input regarding the use of criminal charges to stop terrorist activity,

including the prevention of terrorist attacks.

The ability to have criminal prosecutors involved in the earliest investigative phases of terrorism

cases allows counterterrorism investigators to utilize the full selection of both intelligence and

criminal investigative tools, enabling them to select and interchange these tools to meet the

investigative demands of each particular case. Field Offices use criminal prosecution, or the

threat thereof, in furtherance of the intelligence objective to disrupt and dismantle terrorism,

towards the ultimate goal of preventing terrorist acts. One Field Office notes that if 218 were

allowed to "sunset," its aggressive and effective investigative approach toward terrorism would be

"severely crippled."

Section

220

Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence

Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act enabled courts with jurisdiction over an investigation to issue a

search warrant to compel the production of information held by a service provider located outside

the district, such as unopened e-mail. Previously, the search warrant had to be issued by a court

in the district where the service provider was located. See 18 U.S.C.

2703.

The FBI routinely relies upon this provision when a search warrant is used to obtain the content of

e-mail messages and other related information from lnternet service providers (ISPs) in

accordance with 18 U.S.C.

2703.

Prior to the USA Patriot Act, if an investigator sought a search warrant to obtain the content of

unopened e-mail from a service provider, the investigator was required to obtain this search

warrant from a court in the jurisdiction where the service provider was located. To accomplish

this, the case agent would brief an agent and prosecutor located in the ISP's jurisdiction on the

facts of the case so that they might appear before the court and obtain the search warrant. This

was a time and labor consuming process. Furthermore, because several of the largest

lSPs are

located in a few districts such as, the Northern District of California and the Eastern District of

Virginia, these offices were faced with a substantial workload just to obtain search warrants for

other offices.

While the USA Patriot Act maintained the legal standard of probable cause that must be met

before the search warrant could be issued, it eliminated the additional bureaucratic paperwork

necessary to obtain that warrant in a different jurisdiction than the investigation itself. This

eliminated the need to involve additional agents and prosecutors located in the same jurisdiction

as the ISP. Therefore, this provision expedites the process and minimizes the labor involved

without altering the privacy protection afforded the e-mail and other associated records.

Field Offices repeatedly stated that this was very beneficial to quickly obtain information required

in their investigations. The information obtained from these search warrants often leads to

additional electronic evidence that is otherwise easily and quickly lost. Minimizing the time

required to obtain the initial information from the lSPs is a significant asset to the investigations.

In the "Virginia Jihad" case, six subjects pled guilty and three were convicted of charges including

conspiracy to levy war against the United States and conspiracy to provide material support to the

Taliban. They received sentences ranging from a prison term of four years to life imprisonment.

As a part of this case, court orders were issued to lnternet Service Providers throughout the

country to obtain information that resulted in valuable intelligence and criminal evidence used in

the successful prosecution. Due to Section 220, all the court orders were issued by the district

court where the prosecution occurred making the process much faster and more efficient.

This provision is regularly used in child pornography cases as agents obtain information from

lSPs regarding those trading sexually exploitive images of children. This expedites the

investigative process and minimizes the number of FBI, U.S. Attorney, and judicial personnel

involved in the process, freeing them to more aggressively pursue investigative matters.

Section

223

Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized Disclosures

Prior to the passage of the USA Patriot Act, individuals were permitted only in limited

circumstances to file a cause of action and collect money damages against the United States if

government officials unlawfully disclosed sensitive information collected through wiretaps and

electronic surveillance. Thus, while those engaging in illegal wiretapping or electronic surveillance

were subject to civil liability, those illegally disclosing communications lawfully intercepted

pursuant to a court order generally could not be sued. This section remedied this inequitable

situation by creating an important mechanism for deterring the improper disclosure of sensitive

information and providing redress for individuals whose privacy might be violated by such

disclosures.

Section

225

Immunity for Compliance with FlSA Wiretap

Pursuant to FISA, the United States may obtain wiretap or electronic surveillance orders from the

FlSA Court to monitor the communications of an entity or individual as to whom the court, among

other things, finds probable cause to believe is a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power,

such as an international terrorist or spy. Generally, however, as in the case of criminal wiretaps

and electronic surveillance, the United States requires the assistance of private communications

providers, such as telephone companies, to carry out such court orders. Prior to the passage of

the USA Patriot Act, while those assisting in the implementation of criminal wiretaps were

provided with immunity, no similar immunity protected those companies and individuals assisting

the government in carrying out wiretap and surveillance orders issued by the FlSA Court under

FISA. This section ended this anomaly in the law by immunizing from civil liability

communications service providers and others who assist the United States in the execution of

such FlSA surveillance orders, thus helping to ensure that such entities and individuals will

comply with orders issued by the FlSC without delay.

In an FBI Field Office, a case agent was able to convince a company to assist in the installation of

technical equipment pursuant to a FlSA order by providing a letter outlining the immunity from

civil liability associated with complying with the FlSA order. The target was an espionage subject.

Section

213

-Delayed Notice Search Warrants

While not scheduled to sunset, the USA Patriot Act's delayed notice provision, Section 213, has

been the subject of criticism and various legislative proposals. The FBI believes that Section 213

is an invaluable tool in the war on terror and our efforts to combat serious criminal conduct. It is

important to note that delayed notice warrants were not created by the USA Patriot Act. Rather.

the Act simply codified a common law practice recognized by courts across the country and

created a uniform nationwide standard for the issuance of those warrants. The USA Patriot Act

ensures that delayed notice search warrants are evaluated under the same criteria across the

nation. Like any other search warrant, a delayed notice search warrant is issued by a federal

judge only upon a showing that there is probable cause to believe that the property to be

searched for or seized constitutes evidence of a criminal offense. A delayed notice warrant differs

from an ordinary search warrant oniy in that the judge specifically authorizes the law enforcement

officers executing the warrant to wait for a limited period of time before notifying the subject of the

search that a search had been executed.

Delayed notice search warrants provide a crucial option to law enforcement and can only be

issued if a federal judge finds that one of five tailored circumstances exists. The FBI has

requested this authority in several cases. In most instances, the FBI seeks delayed notice when

contemporaneous notice would reasonably be expected to cause serious jeopardy to an ongoing

investigation.

ADDITIONAL TOOLS TO FIGHT TERRORISM

As I have described above, the USA Patriot Act has been invaluable in providing the FBI with

tools that it needs to fight terrorism in the 21st Century. This committee has been one of our

strongest supporters in this effort and for this the men and women of the FBI are grateful. Having

said that,

would like to address another area in which the FBI needs the committee's support in

order to continue to fulfill its primary mission of protecting America from further terrorist attacks.

Administrative Subpoenas

Planning, funding, supporting and committing acts of terrorism all are federal crimes. For many

years, the FBI has had administrative subpoena authority for investigations of crimes ranging

from drug trafficking to health care fraud to child exploitation. Yet, when it comes to terrorism

investigations, the FBI has no such authority.

Instead, we rely on two tools

National Security Letters (NSLs) and orders for FlSA business

records. Although both are useful and important tools in our national security investigations.

administrative subpoena power would greatly enhance our abilities to obtain information.

Information that may be obtained through an NSL is limited in scope and enforcement is difficult.

FlSA business record requests require the submission of an application for an order to the FlSA

Court. In investigations where there is a need to obtain information expeditiously. Section 215,

which does not contain an emergency provision, may not be the most effective process to

undertake. The administrative subpoena power would be a valuable complement to these tools

and provide added efficiency to the FBI's ability to investigate and disrupt terrorism operations

and our intelligence gathering efforts. It would provide the government with an enforcement

mechanism which currently does not exist with NSLs. Moreover, it would bring the authorities of

agents and analysts investigating terrorism into line with the authorities the FBI already has to

combat other serious crimes. I would like to stress that the administrative subpoena power

proposal should provide the recipient the ability to quash the subpoena on the same grounds as a

grand jury subpoena.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the importance of the provisions of the USA

Patriot Act I have discussed today in the war against terrorism cannot be overstated. They are

crucial to our present and future successes. By responsibly using the statutes provided by

Congress, the FBI has made substantial progress in its ability to proactively investigate and

prevent terrorism and protect lives, while at the same time protecting civil liberties. in renewing

those provisions scheduled to "sunset" at then end of this year. Congress will ensure that the FBI

will continue to have the tools it needs to combat the very real threat to America posed by

terrorists and their supporters. In addition, by giving the FBI administrative subpoena authority.

Congress will enable the FBI to be more efficient in its Counterterrorism efforts. Thank you for

your time today. I am happy to answer any of your questions.